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I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 30, 2021, two deputies from the Jacksonville Sherriff’s
Office arrived at a domestic violence call at an area hotel.1 There, they would
encounter an individual identified as Michael Leon Hughes, a thirty-two-yearold African American man who was accused of forcing his way into a hotel
room belonging to a female companion.2 Upon arrival, Hughes refused to
leave, so a struggle with law enforcement ensued.3 Hughes obtained one of
the deputies’ tasers during the commotion and shocked him.4 In response, the
officer discharged his firearm and killed Hughes.5
On May 27, 2020, approximately one year before the incident with
Mr. Hughes, the Tallahassee Police Department encountered an African
*
Marc Consalo is a faculty member at the University of Central Florida
(“UCF”) in their legal studies department. He received his LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from
Stetson University Law School in 2016, his J.D. from UCF in 1999, and his B.A. from Rollins
College in 1996. He presently serves as a special magistrate for the Town of Oakland, Florida.
In addition to his teaching duties, Professor Consalo works as a conflict attorney in and for the
Ninth Judicial Circuit in Orange and Osceola Counties. At UCF, he teaches a variety of classes,
including Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and Trial Advocacy
1.
Marilyn Parker, JSO Identifies Man Shot, Killed by Police at Argyle Forest
Hotel, NEWS4JAX, http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/2021/03/31/jso-identifies-man-shotkilled-by-police-at-argyle-forest-hotel/ (last updated Mar. 31, 2021, 7:15 PM); Mindy Wadley
& Robert Bradfield, ‘It Wasn’t Supposed to Go That Way’: Family of Man Killed by JSO at
Jacksonville Hotel Demand Release of Video, FIRST COAST NEWS (Apr. 6, 2021, 9:04 PM),
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/family-of-man-killed-jso-demandsanswers/77-f0f90fec-9be9-4d36-86de-15938a893509.
2.
Parker, supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
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American woman.6 This woman was Natosha Tony McDade, who was
accused of stabbing another individual outside an apartment complex.7 While
reports differ, law enforcement officers asserted that McDade aimed a firearm
at police upon their arrival.8 When she refused to comply with requests to
lower her weapon, officers opened fire and killed her.9
On their face, these two instances seem to share many similarities.10
For instance, both cases involve individuals who died at the hands of law
enforcement.11 Both individuals were African American and both seemed to
have suffered from mental illness.12 Yet, while the similarities between the
alleged perpetrators seem quite evident, what may not be as immediately
apparent are the similarities of the law enforcement officers involved in both
the shootings13 In both instances, the Tallahassee Police Department and the
Jacksonville Sherriff’s Office tried to prevent the identities of the officers and
deputies from being divulged to the public under Florida’s Crime Victim’s Bill
of Rights, more commonly known as, Florida’s version of Marsy’s Law.14
Currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court is a request from
the City of Tallahassee, as well as numerous media groups, to accept
jurisdiction over a First District Court of Appeal case specifically finding that
the officers in these shootings are considered “victims” as defined by the
Florida Constitution, and as such, they enjoy protections guaranteed to them
under Marsy’s Law, specifically preventing the disclosure of their identities to
the public.15
6.
See Dara Kam, Should Victims’ Rights Law Shield Officer’s Identity?,
NEWS4JAX
(June
11,
2020,
8:20
PM),
http://www.news4jax.com/news/florida/2020/06/12/should-victims-rights-law-shield-officersidentity/. It should be noted that while born a female, witnesses report that Ms. McDade selfidentified as a male. Id.; Jeff Burlew, Tallahassee Police Release Name of Person Shot and
Killed
by
an
Officer
After
Stabbing,
TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT.,
http://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/local/2020/05/28/tallahassee-police-releases-namenatosha-tony-shot-and-killed-officer-after-stabbing/5272571002/ (last updated May 30, 2020,
8:18 PM).
7.
Burlew, supra note 6; see also Kam, supra note 6.
8.
Kam, supra note 6.
9.
See Burlew, supra note 6; Kam, supra note 6.
10.
See Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1.
11.
Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1.
12.
See Kam, supra note 6; Burlew, supra note 6; Wadley & Bradfield, supra
note 1.
13.
See Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1.
14.
See Kam, supra note 6; Parker, supra note 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
15.
The News Serv. of Fla., City of Tallahassee & Media Groups Urge Florida
Supreme Court to Hear ‘Marsy’s Law’ Case, WFSU PUB. MEDIA (June 15, 2021, 12:00 PM),
http://news.wfsu.org/wfsu-local-news/2021-06-15/city-of-tallahassee-media-groups-urgeflorida-supreme-court-to-hear-marsys-law-case.
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While the possibility that law enforcement officers may be the target
of a crime is not uncommon, receiving the designation of “victim” after
employing deadly force is a unique and confounding concept worthy of
discussion.16 As such, this Article will attempt to tackle this question and
gauge the argument on both sides as to the applicability of Marsy’s Law in
these scenarios.17
The Article will begin with a discussion of how the State of Florida
has historically defined the term “victim” in criminal law over the years.18
Next, a discussion follows about the history of Marsy’s law and how courts
have interpreted its provisions.19 This Article will then explain in greater detail
the arguments for, and against, Marsy’s Law protecting police identities from
disclosure, especially considering Sunshine Laws and the rights that citizens
enjoy by obtaining access to information.20 Ultimately, this Article attempts
to predict if the Florida Supreme Court does choose to accept jurisdiction for
cases that argue that law enforcement officers are victims under Marsy’s
Law—how the justices will rule on the issues in the case and, moving forward,
where lines will be drawn as to the degree of victimization police must
establish to be protected under Florida’s Crime Victim Bill of Rights.21
II.

IN FLORIDA WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A VICTIM?

The legal definition of what exactly a “victim” is in Florida
jurisprudence is actually not that old of a concept.22 One of the first
explanations of the term comes from a 1969 Florida Fourth District Court of
Appeal case, which involves defendants charged with assault and battery in
Palm Beach County.23 In the case, the appellants focused on the trial court
judge’s use of the term “victim” during his final jury instruction before
deliberation.24 The instruction reads as follows: “One point I made in my
Instructions, I said that—I emphasized you shouldn’t have any sympathy or
compassion either individually or collectively for the defendant in this case,
nor should you have any sympathy or compassion for the victim of this case.”25
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id.
See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part V.
See Lister v. State, 226 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Id.
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty of the offenses, and on appeal,
the appellants argued that the trial judge created undue sympathy for the victim
of the crimes by referring to him as a “victim.”26 In denying their appeal and
affirming the conviction, the appellate court wrote that the definition of a
victim is simply “someone injured under any of various conditions.”27 Citing
Webster’s Dictionary, the court found that the term, in and of itself, was
neither offensive nor emotion invoking.28 It simply designated the status of a
party in a lawsuit.29
Under this somewhat direct and uncomplicated definition, it is not
surprising that little litigation exists about the term from the perspective of
physical injury.30 Instead, as time progressed, most cases regarding the
concept focused on individuals seeking financial compensation from the
illegal acts of an accused.31 This would often result from those close to an
individual who was the target of the crime making a claim for relief.32 For
instance, in a 1982 case from Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal, the
son of a manslaughter victim sought review of a decision from the Bureau of
Crime’s Compensation for payment of psychiatric bills resulting from his
father’s death.33 The parent had passed away as a result of injuries he sustained
as the victim of a battery.34 In dealing with the murder, the son experienced
an exacerbation of a preexisting psychological issue, including a fixation on
wanting to murder his father’s killer.35
Initially, the boy was denied benefits for his psychiatric treatment.36
He appealed to a deputy commissioner who overturned the denial finding that
the heir of the deceased was a victim under the law at the time, which was
Florida’s Crime Compensation Act.37 The Bureau appealed and ultimately
persuaded the appellate court to rule in its favor.38 In granting the appeal, the
three-judge panel concluded that the appellee did not meet the requisite
26.
Id. at 238–39.
27.
Lister, 226 So. 2d at 239–40.
28.
See id. at 239.
29.
See id.
30.
Cf. Div. of Workers’ Comp., Etc. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887, 889–90 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (analyzing mental health injuries as a result of a physical injury).
31.
See Bureau of Crimes Comp., Etc. v. Traas, 421 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
32.
See id.; Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1229 (Fla. 2006).
33.
Traas, 421 So. 2d at 51.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Traas, 421 So. 2d at 51.
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statutory definition of a victim because his injuries were not a “direct result of
the crime.”39 While much of the court’s reasoning centered on the difference
between psychiatric benefits versus non-mental health-related payments,40 a
concern about the causation of the request being linked to the crime itself
appeared germane in determining of victim status.41
Money also seemed to be the primary motivation for the Florida
Supreme Court to finally begin to weigh in on the definition of the term
“victim” in the 1992 case of Battles v. State.42 In Battles, the court weighed
in on a certified question from the district court, specifically, if a good faith
purchaser of stolen goods could be considered a “victim” for purposes of
restitution.43
In trial, Harry Battles, the appellant, was found guilty of selling a
stolen firearm to Gary Murphy, whom the trial court believed had a good faith
basis that the weapon belonged to Battles.44 Murphy later learned that local
law enforcement was investigating the disappearance of a gun belonging to
Kelvin Jordan.45 Having a reason to believe the firearm Battles sold him
actually belonged to Jordan, Murphy turned the gun over to the police.46 As
part of his sentence, the court ordered Battles to pay Murphy forty-five dollars,
the price he sold him the gun for.47
On appeal, Battles argued that Murphy was not a victim of the charge
of dealing in stolen property, so the restitution award was improper.48 The
district court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s sentence.49 However, the
First District Court asked the Florida Supreme Court to review the decision
with the case posing a novel issue.50
39.
Id.
40.
Id.; see also Div. of Workers’ Comp., Etc. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887, 890
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982). The issue of psychiatric benefits being reimbursable was further
explored. See id. There, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida found that mental health
benefits could be paid out by the victims’ compensation fund if a finding was made that such
treatment was a direct result of the crime. Id. at 889–90. Competent substantial medical
evidence could be provided to show that mental health injuries were also physical injuries under
Florida Statute section 960.03. Id. at 890. This would also be in accordance with Florida Statute
section 960.08 authorizing reimbursement for medical care. Id.
41.
See Traas, 421 So. 2d at 51.
42.
602 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1992).
43.
Id. at 1287.
44.
See id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Battles, 593 So. 2d at 1287.
48.
Id. at 1288.
49.
Id. at 1287.
50.
Id.
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In making their judgment to affirm the appellate court’s ruling, the
justices focused on Florida Statute section 775.089, which provides that “the
court shall order the defendant to make restitution to the victim for damage or
loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant’s offense unless it finds
clear and compelling reasons not to order such restitution.”51 Subsection (1)(c)
of the statute further defines the term victim as a “person who suffers property
damage or loss, monetary expense, or physical injury or death as a direct or
indirect result of the defendant’s offense or criminal episode . . . .”52 The court
found a good faith purchaser is, by the very nature of term, an “aggrieved
party.”53 The only person that the individual can seek restitution from would
be the individual guilty of dealing in stolen property.54
Jordan had been made whole when the firearm was returned to him by
the police.55 However, Murphy was still out of the forty-five dollars he
purchased the gun for.56 As such, the court wrote, “[i]f restitution is not
imposed, we are left with the incongruent result of having Battles, a person
convicted of a felony offense, retain the profits of his criminal enterprise at the
expense of a good faith purchaser.”57 Therefore, with this ruling, we begin to
see a further expansion of the term “victim,” beyond those directly affected by
a crime, and later to those individuals with a familial bond to the targeted
prey.58
As time progressed and additional case law developed on the issue of
the expansion of the term “victim,” it is extremely important to point out that
there is a litany of cases finding that law enforcement agencies are not victims
in some Florida jurisdictions and, in a sense, these cases pull the reigns of the
ever-expanding definition of the term “victim.”59

51.
Id. at 1287–88; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(a) (2021).
52.
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c); Battles, 602 So. 2d at 1288.
53.
Battles, 602 So. 2d at 1288.
54.
See id.
55.
See id.
56.
Id.
57.
Id.
58.
See Battles, 602 So. 2d at 1288; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c) (2021).
59.
See e.g., Seidman v. State, 847 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2003); Sam v. State, 741 So. 2d 1247, 1247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam); Taylor
v. State, 672 So. 2d 605, 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).
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For instance, in 1990, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal
determined that an award of restitution was improper specifically because it
was directed to a police agency which “[i]s not a ‘victim’ . . . ” under the law.60
A similar result occurred in the Second District Court of Appeal in 1994,
where a Sheriff’s department was denied restitution under the statute.61 In
both these cases, it is important to note that these expenditures were
reimbursable under Florida Statute section 939.01.62 Yet, of importance to
this discussion is the Florida Legislature’s responsibility to create an entirely
new statute for the payment of these fees, as opposed to the court’s belief that
it needed to use its discretion in expanding the term “victim.”63
Not surprisingly, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal continued
its retraction of the definition of “victim” in the early twenty-first century,
beyond just law enforcement agencies, with the case of P.H. v. State.64 The
case questioned the validity of a restitution payment made to a mother of a
battery victim who incurred lost wages in the amount of $240.65 In reversing
a trial court’s order granting the state’s request for this amount to be
considered restitution, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal determined
that the mother of the battery victim was not a “victim” under the statute.66
The court reviewed the statute at the time of the victim’s compensation, noting
that it specifically read:
Each person who suffers property damage or loss,
monetary expense, or physical injury or death as a direct or indirect
result of the defendant’s offense or criminal episode, and also
includes the victim’s estate if the victim is deceased, and the
victim’s next of kin if the victim is deceased as a result of the
offense. The term includes governmental entities and political
subdivisions, as those terms are defined in s. 11.45, when such
entities are a direct victim of the defendant’s offense or criminal
episode and not merely providing public services in response to the
offense or criminal episode.67
60.
Bain v. State, 559 So. 2d 106, 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per
curiam); see also Staudt v. State, 616 So. 2d 600, 600 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam)
(reversing a trial court’s decision to award the City of Stuart’s police department restitution,
concluding that investigative costs, while a byproduct of a crime, do not somehow make the
investigative agency a victim under the statute).
61.
Knaus v. State, 638 So. 2d 156, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
62.
See id.; Staudt, 616 So. 2d at 600.
63.
Staudt, 616 So. 2d at 600.
64.
774 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
65.
Id. at 729.
66.
Id.
67.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c)(1) (2021).
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Nowhere in the statute does there appear to be any inclusion of
parents’ expenses under restitution.68 Interestingly, the court remarked that if
an argument had been made that the mother’s expenses could have been
“attributed to” her daughter, then a different result may have been reached.69
While the desire to help the mother seemed apparent, the method was not
present in the arguments before the court.70 This final statement by the judges
provides insight into an overarching theme in this Article’s inquiry.71
Perhaps the question is not whether there is a desire among the court
to expand or contract how Florida defines the term “victim.”72 Rather, maybe
the more appropriate examination is whether the courts will follow a strict
constructionist approach and look to the plain meaning of the word, as opposed
to reading something into the term that is not there.73 Assuming this as a
possible guiding principle, the Florida Supreme Court decision in Koile v.
State74 may provide the reader with the most ample guidance of all.75 In Koile,
a defendant charged with murder entered into a plea agreement with the state
during his trial.76 The defendant agreed to serve time in prison and pay an
undetermined amount of restitution.77 The trial court subsequently held a
restitution hearing wherein the deceased’s father testified.78 While evidence
was presented regarding burial expenses and costs associated with the funeral,
the father also explained that he lost $12,000 in income in order to testify and
attend the trial.79 The deceased’s mother made a similar plea for lost income,
except in the amount of $1,500.80
The decedent’s estate made an additional restitution claim for lost
wages on behalf of the murder victim himself.81 He was a first officer for an

68.
See FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c)(1).
69.
P.H., 774 So. 2d at 729.
70.
See id.
71.
See id.
72.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c).
73.
See Koile v. State, 934 So. 2d 1226, 1230–31 (Fla. 2006).
74.
934 So. 2d 1226 (Fla. 2006).
75.
See id. at 1230–31.
76.
Id. at 1228; see also Willoughby Mariano, Convict in Murder Plot Loses
Appeal-Bond Plea, S. FLA. SUNSENTINEL (Nov. 13, 2003), http://www.sunsentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-2003-11-13-0311121452-story.html.
77.
Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1228.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.

2021]

FLORIDA’S MARSY’S LAW

9

airline and anticipated being promoted to captain soon.82 Ultimately, he would
have earned over three million dollars if he had lived to the age of sixty.83
The trial judge granted both parents’ requests for lost wages.84
Further, an order was entered awarding the decedent’s estate just over two
million dollars in lost wages.85 The defendant appealed to the Fifth District
Court of Appeal, which reversed both awards.86 However, the appellate court
recognized the importance of the decision it faced and certified two questions
to the Florida Supreme Court.87 The first was: “Does section 775.089, Florida
Statutes (2003), authorize a restitution award for the lost wages of a next of
kin voluntarily attending the murder trial of the person accused of killing the
victim?”88 The second was: “Does section 775.089, Florida Statutes (2003),
authorize a restitution award for the estate of a murder victim of an amount
consisting of the lost future income of the victim?”89
After concluding that the standard of review in the case was de novo,
the court decided that it was appropriate to follow strict constructionism and
did not need to expand beyond the statute’s plain language.90 The court first
pointed out that the statute reads, “the term ‘victim’ includes not only the
person injured by the defendant, but also the person’s estate if he or she is
deceased, as well as the person’s next of kin if he or she is deceased as a result
of the offense.”91 As such, both the decedent’s estate and the decedent’s
parents would be eligible for restitution in this scenario.92 The court then
continued reviewing the text of the statute.93
Accordingly, reading section 775.089(2)(a)(3) by using the
full definition of “victim” if a crime results in bodily injury, a court
must “reimburse the victim [including his estate and next of kin] for
income lost by the victim [including his estate and next of kin] as a
result of the offense.”94

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1228.
Id. at 1228–29.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id.
Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1229.
Id. at 1228.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 1229, 1230–31.
Id. at 1231.
See Koile, 934 So. 2d at 1231.
See id.
Id.
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While the court ultimately sustained the Fifth District Court of
Appeal’s decision to deny the parents their lost wages,95 it did conclude the
decedent’s estate was a victim, and as such, entitled to an award of lost wages
nonetheless.96
III.

MARSY’S LAW IN FLORIDA

Voters in 2018 took to the polls to strengthen victims’ rights in the
state with the passage of Amendment 6 to the Florida Constitution.97 The
Amendment was passed with support by more than sixty percent of the state’s
population.98 Touted as Florida’s Crime Victim’s Bill of Rights, Article 1
Section 16 of the Florida Constitution adopted the language of Marsy’s Law
to prevent disclosing the identities of victims to stop others from “harass[ing]
the victim or the victim’s family, or [records] which could disclose
confidential or privileged information of the victim” being made public.99
Marsy’s law originated from a case in California involving an
individual named Marsalee Nicholas who was then a college student.100 In
1983, Ms. Nicholas’ ex-boyfriend murdered her, and years later bumped into
Ms. Nicholas’ family at a local grocery store.101 The family had no idea that
the alleged murderer had been released, causing them a great deal of distress
upon seeing him in the store.102 Since February 2020, voters across the country
have approved versions of Marsy’s Law in California, Illinois, North Dakota,
Ohio, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South
95.
Id. at 1234. The decision to deny the lost wages claim was not based on a
finding that the parents were not victims under the statute. See id. Rather, the issues focused
on the parents choosing to be present for the entirety of the three-week trial. See Koile, 934 So.
2d at 1234. The court concluded that had the mother and father been subpoenaed to attend the
whole event, the result may have been different. See id. However, because of the voluntary
nature of their attendance, no causal link existed between the crime and the costs. See id.
Interestingly, the possible other outcome may have been a reduction in the amount of the award,
at least for the father, as there was evidence that his testimony was required for a small part of
the event. See id.
96.
Id.
97.
Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters,
MARSY’S
L.
FOR
FLA.,
http://www.marsyslawforfl.com/amendment_6_marsy_s_law_for_florida_approved_by_florid
a_voters (last updated Dec. 6, 2018).
98.
Id.
99.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(5).
100.
Amendment 6/Marsy’s Law for Florida Approved by Florida Voters, supra
note 97.
101.
Id.
102.
See id.
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Dakota.103 Marsy’s Law was also passed, but later overturned, in Montana
and Kentucky.104 Additionally, seventy-four percent of the electorate
approved the law in Pennsylvania; however, those results have not yet been
certified because the Amendment’s constitutionality is in litigation.105 A
similar situation now exists in Wisconsin.106
Though it has only been around for a short period of time, there has
already been litigation surrounding Florida’s version of Marsy’s Law and its
implementation in the Sunshine State.107 For instance, in 2019, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal struggled to see with how Marsy’s Law changed the
state’s role in advocating for restitution for a victim in the case of Morrill v.
State.108 In Morrill, the defendant pled guilty to a charge of dealing in stolen
property.109 One of the items that was alleged to have been pawned was a
necklace belonging to the victim.110 During a restitution hearing, the trial court
ordered $2,200 be paid to the victim for the stolen jewelry.111
The defendant appealed the trial court’s valuation based on a failure
to follow the Hawthorne test.112 Hawthorne requires that certain factors be
employed to arrive at a fair determination.113 These factors include: “(1)
original market cost; (2) [the] manner in which the item was used; (3) the
103.
State Efforts, MARSY’S L., http://www.marsyslaw.us/states (last visited Jan.
10, 2021).
104.
Katie Meyer, Marsy’s Law Explained: What You Need to Know About the
Victims’
Rights
Amendment
on
the
Nov.
5
Ballot,
WITF,
http://www.witf.org/2019/10/28/marsys-law-explained/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2019, 8:40 AM).
105.
See id.
106.
Marco Kirchner, State Used Wrong Standard in “Marsy’s Law” Defense,
WIS. JUST. INITIATIVE: BLOG (Mar. 22, 2021), http://www.wjiinc.org/blog/category/marsyslaw.
107.
See Toole v. State, 270 So. 3d 371, 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019). It
should be noted that while Marsy’s Law was only implemented in 2019, case law that predates
its passage plays an important role in understanding its content. See id. For instance, in the
case of Barnett v. Antonacci, the appellate court concluded that that a prosecutor’s decision to
enter a Nolle Prosequi is not a “stage” in the proceeding within the meaning of the constitutional
provision guaranteeing victims of crime the right to be informed, present, and to be heard. 122
So. 3d 400, 406 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013). As such, Marsy’s Law would not be applicable
in these instances. Id. Therefore, this decision holds great significance in the discussion of who
a would-be victim would be under the law, as it clearly creates precedent that courts may look
to before 2019 in determining this question and need not attempt to extrapolate beyond previous
case law should guidance already exist. See id.; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b).
108.
268 So. 3d 160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
109.
Id. at 161.
110.
Id.
111.
Id. at 161–62.
112.
See id. at 162.
113.
Morrill, 268 So. 3d at 162.
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general condition and quality of the item; and (4) the percentage of
depreciation.”114 In this case, the state failed to follow these requirements and
only provided hearsay regarding value.115
However, the court did express concern regarding how Marsy’s Law
may have reduced the burden on victims in establishing restitution amounts,
and in fact, the court imposed a new requirement upon prosecutors.116 The
appellate court cited its own recent decision in Toole v. State,117 where it
recognized that “proving restitution continues to be difficult for victims, and
receiving compensation for their loss continues to be elusive.”118 Further, the
court proposed that under Marsy’s Law, the state must now provide assistance
in establishing the condition and quality of stolen property to determine the
replacement cost.119
In Morrill, the court acknowledged that the State had not provided this
assistance.120 In fact, it went as far as to say that the State took no steps to
meet its potential burden to the victim under Marsy’s Law.121 While it
maintained its final ruling in favor of the appellant, it also provided clear dicta
that Marsy’s Law may have created mandates on Florida state prosecutors to
advocate more rigorously for victims’ rights.122
One finds similar advice in a case from Florida’s Third District Court
of Appeal called Alvarez-Hernandez v. State.123 While this case could be
viewed as a cautionary tale regarding vindictive sentencing, it holds equal
relevance to Marsy’s Law in admonishing courts to ensure victims’ have input
in plea negotiations.124 The defendant—charged with second-degree murder
with a deadly weapon, aggravated battery with great bodily harm or with a
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
See id. at 163.
117.
270 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019). Ultimately, the court in Toole
v. State certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
Is Hawthorne’s formula for determining restitution based on the fair
market value of the victim’s property still viable after the passage of Amendment 6
(Marsy’s Law), or should a trial court no longer be bound by fair market value as the
sole standard for determining restitution amounts, and instead exercise such
discretion as required to further the purposes of restitution, including consideration
of hearsay?

Id. at 375. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the question as moot due to
defendant’s death. State v. Toole, No. SC19-456, 2019 WL 2275025, at *1 (Fla. May 29, 2019).
118.
Toole, 270 So. 3d at 374; Morrill, 268 So. 3d at 163.
119.
Morrill, 268 So. 3d at 163.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
See id.
123.
319 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
124.
Id. at 123.
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deadly weapon, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—appealed his
sentence of twenty-five years in prison followed by ten years of probation.125
During a pretrial conference, the state attorney offered the defendant eleven
years in prison.126 The defendant rejected this offer in open court.127 Defense
counsel also alerted the judge, in chambers, that the previously assigned trial
judge had offered the defendant a six-year prison sentence, followed by five
years of probation.128 That too had been spurned by the defendant.129 The
sitting judge then re-extended the six-year offer to the defendant, who again
refused it.130 The defendant argued on appeal that the court’s twenty-five-year
(300 months) sentence, which was over double the minimum sentence on his
criminal code scoresheet, was vindicative.131
While the opinion focused on whether indeed the trial court’s
disposition order constituted vindicative sentencing for exercising one’s right
to go to trial, the appellate court expressed its displeasure that the victim was
not present for the in-chambers plea negotiations.132 “[W]e are concerned by
the in-chambers, off-the-record plea discussions engaged in by the predecessor
judge, and take this opportunity to caution trial judges . . . .”133 The appellate
court further explained that the right for a victim to be present, informed, and
provide input is sacred, especially with the passage of Marsy’s Law.134
This record requirement is all the more important in light of the
provisions of Marsy’s Law, which in 2018 amended Article I,
Section 16 of the Florida Constitution to, inter alia, “preserve and
protect the right of crime victims to achieve justice, ensure a
meaningful role throughout the criminal and juvenile justice
systems for crime victims, and ensure that crime victims’ rights and
interests are respected and protected by law in a manner no less
vigorous than protections afforded to criminal defendants and
juvenile delinquents.”135

But perhaps one of the best examples of how powerful victims’ rights
are under Marsy’s Law can be seen in a recent 2021 case from Florida’s Fourth
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
Alvarez-Hernandez, 319 So. 3d at 122.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 123, 125.
Alvarez-Hernandez, 319 So. 3d at 125.
Id.
Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I § 16(b)).
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District Court of Appeal, where the appellate court found that a victim’s right
to be present trumps a defendant’s right to have witnesses sequestered.136 In
that case, the defendant and the victim were siblings who got into an
altercation at a family event.137 The defendant found a knife and stabbed the
victim during the squabble, ultimately killing him.138
At trial, the State invoked the rule of sequestration and requested the
defendant’s father—who was also the decedent victim’s father—to wait
outside the courtroom before testifying for the defense.139 The trial court judge
agreed, and ordered the father to leave the courtroom.140 After the completion
of several witnesses’ testimony, the defendant requested that the father be
permitted to return to the courtroom.141 The trial court denied this request.142
Ultimately, the jury convicted the defendant of a lesser included offense, and
the judge sentenced him to thirty years in prison.143
On appeal, the defendant brought forth three issues for review.144
However, the appellate court focused on whether the trial court had violated
the father’s right as the decedent victim’s next of kin to be present under
Marsy’s Law.145 While the appellate court quickly found that any potential
error in excluding the father was harmless error, it still discussed the
importance of the rights of a victim versus the rights of a defendant.146
The court’s analysis referenced a Florida Supreme Court case from
2000 called Booker v. State.147 In that case, similar to Butler v. State,148 the
defendant argued that the victim’s great-niece should have been present during
the sentencing phase of a murder trial.149 However, even though the Florida
Supreme Court found that it was an error to exclude the great-niece, the court
found that the defendant suffered no prejudice, and as such, the error was
harmless.150 Therefore, while the appellate court alluded that the Butler trial
judge incorrectly excluded the father, no harm had occurred, and the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Butler v. State, 315 So. 3d 30, 34 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
Id. at 32.
Id.
See id. at 33.
See id.
Butler, 315 So. 3d at 32–33.
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id. at 32.
See id. at 33.
Butler, 315 So. 3d at 33.
Id. at 33–34; 773 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2000).
315 So. 3d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
Booker, 773 So. 2d at 1086–87.
Id. at 1095–96.
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conviction was affirmed.151 But in doing this, the appellate court created a
precedent that Marsy’s Law trumps a defendant’s rights in certain
circumstances.152
Perhaps, however, one of the Florida Court of Appeals’ most
important pronouncements as to Marsy’s Law comes not from the analysis of
what the law does but rather what it fails to do.153 In 2020, the Florida First
District Court of Appeal concluded that in the fervor of creating stronger rights
for victims, the legislature had failed to include a method to implement and
protect these rights for the very people the law was meant to protect.154 In the
case of L.T. v. State,155 the appellate court observed “[a]s written, Marsy’s Law
does not provide procedures to implement and enforce the victim’s rights set
forth in the law or remedies for failure to recognize those rights.”156 In the
case, L.T., a juvenile crime victim, claimed the trial court violated her rights
under Marsy’s Law when it failed to notify her regarding certain stages in the
delinquency process.157
After being arrested for the alleged molestation of L.T., the juvenile
defendant attended a detention hearing, where over the state attorney’s
objection, he was released to home detention.158 The victim never received
notice of the detention hearing; however, the Department of Juvenile Justice
did alert L.T. of the court’s final decision after it had occurred.159 The victim’s
mother then filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of the victim.160 A month
later, a second attorney filed a Notice of Appearance indicating she would be
acting as co-counsel for the victim.161 Shortly thereafter, the victim’s attorneys
filed a pleading notifying the court, the State, and the defense of the victim’s
intent to exercise her rights under Marsy’s Law.162
Counsel for the defense moved to strike all pleadings filed on behalf
of L.T., citing a lack of standing as she was not a party to the case.163 During
a hearing, the trial court granted the defense’s request.164 In doing so, the court
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Butler, 315 So. 3d at 34.
See id.
See L.T. v. State, 296 So. 3d 490, 499 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
See id. at 499–500.
296 So. 3d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
Id. at 499.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
L.T., 296 So. 3d at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 494.
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pronounced, “there is no express language contained in [Marsy’s Law] that
allows the victim or the victim’s representative to file a Notice of Appearance
on behalf of the victim and become a party to criminal proceedings.”165
On appeal, attorneys for the victim asserted that under Marsy’s Law,
the legislature envisioned granting victims of crimes similar rights and
protections afforded to defendants in the criminal process.166 Yet, the
appellate court believed that a careful balance between the rights of both
entities needs to occur “without impacting the basic constitutional foundations
of the criminal justice system.”167 While the court believed Marsy’s Law
provided a framework for victims to have a “legally cognizable interest in a
criminal proceeding,” this was not equivalent to elevating them to the status
of a party in the case.168 As such, the appellate court concluded that there was
no error in striking the victim’s pleadings, as she still had meaningful input in
the case pursuant to the requirements of Florida’s Constitution.169
In closing, the District Court of Appeals opined that trial courts lacked
the authority to create a system to implement victims’ rights under Marsy’s
Law.170 Instead, this responsibility rested squarely with the legislature and its
rulemaking authority.171 In response, the Florida Bar created a joint
subcommittee charged with addressing this lack of guidance regarding the
execution of the law.172 Born from that subcommittee, Rule 2.423 of Judicial
Administration has been proposed.173 Rule 2.423 provides three procedures
for the invocation of victim rights.174 The first falls to the filer of the report.175
This could be either the initial law enforcement agency or the intake unit for
the state attorney’s office.176 However, the option provides for the victims
themselves to file a request.177

165.
L.T., 296 So. 3d at 494.
166.
Id. at 495.
167.
Id.
168.
Id. at 497.
169.
See id. at 497, 499.
170.
L.T., 296 So. 3d at 499–500.
171.
Id.
172.
See Rule of Judicial Administration Amendment Concerning Marsy’s Law,
FLA. BAR (Mar. 24, 2020), http://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/rule-of-judicialadministration-amendment-concerning-marsys-law/.
173.
Id.
174.
See id.
175.
Id.
176.
See id.
177.
Rule of Judicial Administration Amendment Concerning Marsy’s Law,
supra note 172.
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Unfortunately, the subcommittee focused only on the confidentiality
right of Marsy’s Law and not the privileges found within the document.178 The
Florida Supreme Court held oral arguments regarding the proposed rule on
June 2, 2021.179 Yet, since writing this Article, no further guidance has been
provided.180 As such, much remains uncertain regarding the interpretation and
realization of Marsy’s Law moving forward.181
IV.

FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASS’N, INC. V. CITY OF
TALLAHASSEE, 314 SO. 3D 796 (FLA. 1ST DCA 2021)

Perhaps one of the greatest debates arising from the text of Marsy’s
Law itself is the self-contained definition of the term “victim.”182 Specifically,
section 16(b)(11)(e) of the Florida Constitution reads in relevant part:
As used in this section, a “victim” is a person who suffers
direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a
result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or
delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is
committed. The term “victim” includes the victim’s lawful
representative, the parent or guardian of a minor, or the next of kin
of a homicide victim, except upon a showing that the interest of such
individual would be in actual or potential conflict with the interests
of the victim. The term “victim” does not include the accused. The
terms “crime” and “criminal” include delinquent acts and
conduct.183

This definition may sufficiently encompass all possible parties
protected under the law; however, like with most instances of newly passed
legislation, a new debate is on the horizon as one turns to the issue of whether

178.
See id.
179.
6/2/21 Florida Supreme Court Oral Arguments: In Re: Amendments to
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.423 SC20-1128, FLA. CHANNEL,
http://thefloridachannel.org/videos/6-2-21-florida-supreme-court-oral-arguments-in-reamendments-to-florida-rule-of-judicial-administration-2-423-sc20-1128/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2022) [hereinafter Oral Arguments].
180.
See id. (noting that a hearing regarding Rule 2.423 by Florida’s Supreme
Court has been the last official conduct on the matter).
181.
See The News Serv. Of Fla., supra note 15.
182.
See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16, cl. (b)(11)(e).
183.
Id.
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law enforcement officers—in use of force cases—are considered potential
victims under Marsy’s Law.184
After two different encounters, law enforcement in Florida shot and
killed criminal suspects who endangered Tallahassee police officers.185
Following these two events, the City of Tallahassee announced it would
release the names of the officers involved in the shootings.186 In response, the
officers sought to prevent the disclosure of their names through their
bargaining agency—the Police Benevolent Association.187 In doing so, the
Association cited Marsy’s Law, arguing that the officers were victims under
Florida Law and enjoyed the right of confidentiality.188
At the trial court level, the judge found that the officers were not
protected under the confidentiality provision of Marsy’s Law.189 Further, the
trial court judge concluded that this outcome existed for the police even if they
were “victims” under the legislation.190 In doing so, the judge specifically
concluded that “a law enforcement officer acting in his official capacity could
not be a victim under [A]rticle I, [S]ection 16.”191 The trial court’s rationale
focused on the purpose of Marsy’s Law being to protect victims from
harassment and threats from assailant-defendants.192 Here, with their
assailants dead, the officers were not seeking protection from them but from
others in the community who would view the shootings as immoral or
excessive.193 This was not meant to be the purpose of Marsy’s Law.194 The
judge also asserted that the safeguards of the law exist only once “a criminal
proceeding begins.”195
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal began with a reading of
the plain language of the Florida Constitution.196 In doing so, it found that the
trial court judge improperly relied on Article I, Section 24 of the Florida
Constitution when denying the officers’ request, instead of focusing solely on

184.
But see Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796,
799 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
185.
Id. at 797.
186.
Id.; see also The News Serv. Of Fla., supra note 15.
187.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 797.
188.
Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at 797–98.
191.
Id. at 799.
192.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 801.
193.
See id. at 799.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id. at 799–80.
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the four corners of the document.197 Article I, Section 24 of the Florida
Constitution speaks to the public’s right to information and access to
meetings.198 Although at the trial court level, the judge found Marsy’s Law
and this constitutional section to be in conflict, the appellate court disagreed.199
It determined that no conflict existed, and there was no need to venture beyond
the text of Marsy’s Law to begin with.200
When ruling in this fashion, the appellate court quickly pointed out
that Marsy’s Law represented a clear edict from the Florida citizenry.201 This
was not an occasion where a partisan legislature or a rogue judge diverted from
the clear intent of an already existing law.202 In passing Amendment 6, the
state’s people voiced their belief in how important victim’s rights should be.203
Additionally, Article I, Section 24 of the Florida Constitution includes
language that specifically says:
Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public
record made or received in connection with the official business of
any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting
on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted under this
section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution.204

Therefore, no conflict between the two constitutional provisions

205

existed.

The appellate court next discussed whether a police officer who is
threatened with deadly force falls within the definition of a “victim” under
Marsy’s Law.206 As stated previously, the Amendment’s text defines the term
“victim.”207 The appellate court noted that it specifically states, “[a] . . . victim
is a ‘person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or
financial harm . . . .’”208 Thus, a law enforcement officer who is threatened on
the job with deadly force clearly suffers “direct or threatened physical” harm
197.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 800.
198.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a).
199.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 800.
200.
Id.
201.
See id.
202.
See id.
203.
See id.
204.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 801 (emphasis added) (quoting
to FLA. CONST. art. I, §24(a)).
205.
Id.
206.
Id.
207.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(e); see discussion supra Part IV.
208.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 801 (quoting to FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 16(e)).
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and is, therefore, a victim.209 Acting in self-defense or killing the perpetrator
before he or she kills the officer in no way negates this status.210
In making this determination, the appellate court acknowledged the
importance of public interest in holding law enforcement officers responsible
for misconduct while on duty.211 However, the court found that other avenues
could be utilized to hold officers accountable without necessarily revealing
their identities.212
This included procedures such as internal affair
investigations and grand jury proceedings.213 The court also conceded that
Florida’s Sunshine Laws intend to grant public-wide and unhindered access to
information.214 Despite this clear intent, the court remarked it was not the
judicial branch’s prerogative to impute into constitutional text greater breadth
than what exists.215
The appellate court then moved to discuss the trial court’s
determination that one does not become a victim until the criminal process
commences.216 Again, the appellate court found this interpretation was not the
clear wording of Marsy’s Law’s.217 Instead, the document reads that those
rights begin at the time of “victimization.”218 Furthermore, there is no
requirement that a prosecution case be filed for rights to apply in the law
itself.219 While many of the protections found in Marsy’s Law apply to
different proceedings throughout the court process, the appellate court
determined that the trial judge moved beyond the plain language to establish a
requirement that did not exist.220
Lastly, the appellate court addressed the trial court’s belief that
Marsy’s Law applied only to “information” and “records” and not necessarily
the identity of the person’s name.221 It quickly rejected this argument stating
that “information . . . that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the
victim’s family includes records that could reveal the victim’s name or

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 802.
See id.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 802.
Id.
Id. at 802–03.
See id. at 803.
Id.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 803.
Id.
See id. at 802–04.
Id. at 804 (emphasis added) (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b)(5)).
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identity.”222 To rule otherwise would create a result contrary to the clear intent
of the Amendment’s passage to begin with.223
V.

ANALYSIS

Beginning in 2015, The Washington Post started to keep track of every
individual who was killed by law enforcement in the United States.224 As of
September 30, 2021, that number was over 5,000 individuals.225 While most
of the individuals killed were Caucasian, African Americans were
disproportionately killed in larger numbers.226 In 2019, out of the top twenty
law enforcement agencies with the most killings caused by police, two resided
in Florida.227 The Miami-Dade Police Department was fourteenth in the
nation, and the Jacksonville Sherriff’s Office was sixteenth.228
Since 2005, there have been forty-two officers arrested for murder in
the United States.229 Of those arrested, only five were convicted of murder.230
The most prevalent conviction was for manslaughter, with eleven
convictions.231 However, the list of resolutions run the gamut from improper
discharge of a firearm to involuntary manslaughter.232

222.
Id.
223.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 804.
224.
925 People Have Been Shot and Killed by Police in the Past Year, WASH.
POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ (last
updated Jan. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Shot by Police in 2021].
225.
Id.
226.
Id. While African Americans account for only thirteen percent of the
United States’ population, they make up one-quarter of all police shootings. Id.; Joe Fox et al.,
What We’ve Learned About Police Shootings 5 Years After Ferguson, WASH. POST (Aug. 9,
2019), http://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/09/what-weve-learned-about-policeshootings-years-after-ferguson/. Additionally, over one-third of the unarmed victims of police
shootings were also African American. Fox et al., supra. In fact, an African American man is
four times more likely to be shot by police than their white counterparts. Id.
227.
See id.
228.
See id.
229.
Statista Rsch. Dep’t, Number of NonFederal Police Officers Arrested for
Murder Who Have Been Convicted Between 2005 and 2020, by Charge, STATISTA (June 10,
2020),
http://www.statista.com/statistics/1123386/convictions-police-officers-arrestedmurder-charge-us/.
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Id.
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Id.
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Noting these statistics, it would be remiss not to point out the political
climate at the time this Article is being written.233 Names like George Floyd
and Breonna Taylor will forever live in infamy as individuals whose deaths
began a conversation about police accountability.234 Equally important are
names like Derek Chauvin and the role public pressure played in demanding
justice in his trial.235 One cannot help but ponder—if Derek Chauvin’s name
was not made public when it was, would a similar result have been reached?*
While examples of public pressure assisting in accountability are available, so
too are examples of when the will of the people thwarted the smooth pursuit
of justice.236
With these realities in mind, predicting that the Florida Supreme Court
will accept jurisdiction over Florida Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of
Tallahassee237 seems plausible.238 While our highest court may wish to avoid
controversy, it seems evident that with the First District Court’s decision, more
Florida law enforcement agencies will soon follow suit.239 And with media
companies leading the charge for disclosure, there appears to be both people
and money behind both sides.240

233.
See Julie Pierce Onos, How Journalists Cover Police Brutality Is a Matter
of Life and Death, MEDIA DIVERSITY INST. (June 9, 2020), http://www.media-diversity.org/howjournalists-cover-police-brutality-is-a-matter-of-life-and-death/.
234.
Id.; Black Lives Taken: George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud
Arbery, DOSOMETHING.ORG, http://www.dosomething.org/us/articles/black-lives-taken (last
visited Jan. 10, 2022).
235.
See Black Lives Taken: George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud
Arbery, supra note 234; Onos, supra note 233.
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(Dec.
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2020),
http://www.powerdms.com/why-powerdms/law-enforcement/importance-of-accountability-inlaw-enforcement. Kim Potter was charged with the death of Daunte Wright in Minneapolis,
Minnesota when she claimed she mistook her firearm for her taser. N’dea Yancey-Bragg,
Prosecutor Assigned to Case of Ex-cop Charged in Daunte Wright’s Death Resigns Over
‘Vitriol’
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USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2021/05/25/prosecutor-assigned-to-kimpotterdaunte-wright-case-resigns/7426386002/ (May 25, 2021, 11:48 AM). The prosecutor
resigned after ten years of service to his community because of the public pressure surrounding
the case. Id. His resignation letter which was made public cited that “‘vitriol’ and ‘partisan
politics’ made it difficult to pursue justice.” Id.
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314 So. 3d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
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See id. at 804.
240.
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Surely, the Florida Supreme Court recognizes that striking a balance
between two of the most sacred principles will need to occur.241 On the one
hand, we have a sharp mandate that victims’ rights are of paramount
importance in our communities.242 On the other hand, transparency and access
have been hallmarks of Florida from very early on.243 The existence of our
Sunshine Laws reflect a desire by the public to hold government officials
accountable for misconduct while granting citizens access to information.244
Assuming the Florida Supreme Court does eventually weigh in on the case,
how can one predict what the outcome will be?245
Perhaps, in foretelling the outcome, previous Florida Supreme Court
cases acknowledging the deference that the court provides the will of people
is instructive.246 Indeed, a long line of precedent establishes the court’s
willingness to bend to the desires of its citizenry to the point of permitting
votes, in some circumstances, to overwrite technical or minor defects in the
Amendment process itself.247
With this in mind, all courts that have weighed in on Marsy’s Law
agree that the will of the people was to extend the rights of victims in the State
of Florida.248 Therefore, it would be consistent with this goal not only to
extend the rights of victims, but also who may be considered a victim, to
appease the will of the electorate.249
Yet, it is important to recognize the slippery slope that could occur
should law enforcement officers involved in lethal force cases be granted this
status.250 For instance, would the same argument not apply to officers who are
involved in shootings where the perpetrators do not die?251 In both cases, the
law enforcement officer is “a person who suffers direct or threatened physical,
psychological, or financial harm . . . .”252 For that matter, cases involving
charges of battery on a law enforcement officer or resisting an officer with
241.
Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 314 So. 3d at 799, 802.
242.
See id. at 802–04.
243.
Joseph T. Eagleton, Walking on Sunshine Laws: How Florida’s Free Press
History in the U.S. Supreme Court Undermines Open Government, FLA. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2012,
at 23–24.
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248.
See Morrill v. State, 268 So. 3d 160, 162–63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
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See id. at 163.
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See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So. 3d 796,
801 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2021).
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violence all potentially possess legitimate legal arguments that Marsy’s Law
is applicable.253 If the Florida Supreme Court does affirm the decision in
Florida Police Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee, a potential plethora of
battery and assault cases may emerge, insulating police from disclosure.254
However, even if this were to pass, it is necessary to remind ourselves
that the criminal justice system is built on a foundation to protect the rights of
the accused, not the media nor the public’s right to information.255 If, indeed,
law enforcement is no longer the subject of public scrutiny, ultimately, this
could have very little impact on a defendant accused of a crime.256 Marsy’s
Law refers to public disclosure.257 This does not necessarily equate to private
disclosure to a defense attorney.258 It does not prevent a defense attorney from
taking a deposition, subpoenaing employment records, or cross-examining a
witness.259 It simply requires additional steps to keep this information
private.260
As such, should the Florida Supreme Court affirm the ruling when it
potentially will have little, if any, effect on our criminal justice system as a
whole.261 So, the question remains: how important is knowing who these
officers are to Floridians?262 For many, the answer may simply be: not that
much.263 In a recent article from 2019, Florida was in the top twenty-five states
to be a police officer in.264 Florida is considered to be quite conservative by
many, which some equate to meaning pro-law enforcement.265 Therefore, the
average Floridian may not care if officer names are disclosed or not.266
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Ultimately, in deciding whether or not the Florida Supreme Court
decides to address the decision, what the public does or does not want may not
be all that germane to their conclusion.267 The First District Court of Appeal
provided a very rational and logical analysis in employing the plain language
test to the text in Marsy’s Law.268 This strict construction analysis was
consistent with the approach that multiple courts have used in Florida for over
fifty years when defining the term “victim.”269 The District Court of Appeals
also recognized the traditional role of the judiciary and did not extend its
authority by creating new law, rather, the court simply interpreted the existing
law.270 As the appellate court wrote, should the public wish to exclude officers
from Marsy’s Law, mechanisms already exist to accomplish that very goal.271
These include a proposal of a joint resolution of the legislature, a constitution
revision commission, a citizen initiative petition, a constitutional convention,
or a taxation and budget reform commission.272 But having judges discern
exclusions into already existing laws would be improper.273 Simply stated, it
does not fall on the courts to read an exclusion into a portion of the Florida
Constitution when one clearly does not exist there to begin with.274 Why
would the Florida Supreme Court, therefore, engage in such a practice, when
instead they could continue the time-honored practice of using strict
constructionism and follow the document’s plain language?275
VI.

CONCLUSION

At the time of writing this Article, the Florida Supreme Court has yet
to decide if it will accept jurisdiction over the case of Florida Police
Benevolent Ass’n v. City of Tallahassee.276 The court may be waiting to see if
other district courts weigh in on the issue and if a conflict between jurisdictions
267.
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arises.277 On the other hand, the court may simply be deciding if the case is
truly worthy of review, depending on the amount of public outcry.278 In either
scenario, Marsy’s Law may ultimately be a cautionary tale for people to be
careful what they wish for, or rather, the electorate to be careful what they vote
for.279
As stated previously, Amendment 6—Marsy’s Law—passed in 2018,
with over sixty-one percent of the electorate voting “yes.”280 In a state where
thirty-six percent of voters identify as Republican and thirty-six percent as
Democrats, the Amendment appeared to have bipartisan support.281 Of course,
billed as a victim’s bill of rights, few, if any, could have foreseen the proposal
as a tool to hide the identities of officers in fatal shootings. 282 But even if this
outcome was unforeseeable, it may not necessarily matter to many.283
While the role of the press in identifying certain law enforcement
misconduct is undeniable, it may not always be understood.284 In a June 2020
article composed by Julie Pierce Onos for Media Diversity Institute, the author
wrote, “[f]or Black people, media coverage of police brutality is a matter of
life and death.”285 The article surmises that the role of the press in shining a
light on the injustices suffered by African Americans at the hands of law
enforcement is undeniable.286 In fact, the author argues if the press had not
been so slow to recognize its role in supporting minorities, many past
injustices may have been resolved differently.287 But while the public is now
waking up to the vital role the press plays in exposing police brutality, this
arousal is only recent.288 As such, many do not realize how the press’s inability
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to report on these matters could impact justice in these cases.289 This may
result in numerous Floridians not recognizing the role the media plays in
obtaining justice for minorities when identifying individual officers in fatal
shootings.290
Ultimately, the effect of Marsy’s Law in protecting the identity of law
enforcement in use of force cases may already reflect the will of most
Floridians.291 However, if this comes at the cost of allowing the public to
supervise potentially the most powerful branch of government, for some, the
cost may be too high.292 If the Florida Supreme Court does weigh in on the
issue, the justice who submits their opinion will most likely affirm the First
District’s decision.293 In doing so, the outcome may do a little more than
retrace the well-thought-out and reasoned opinion of the lower court.294
Additionally, this approach will be consistent with precedent in following
strict constructionism and adhering to the plain language of the text.295 But in
doing so, the outcome may forever weaken what some call the fourth branch
of government—the press.296 For if the press cannot ultimately provide
oversight in these cases, is the public ready for the police to police their
own?297
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